James Bunyan
On 2nd November 1917, Lord Rothschild, the principal British financial supporter of Zionism, received an open letter from the British government that stated that “His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people,” the first concrete expression of official British backing for Zionism.1 While the vague language and different sub-clauses, which served to detach Britain from any firm, practical commitment, were added as a result of British domestic opposition, there was in reality no strong political resistance from any, ensuring the Declaration was passed and subsequently incorporated into the Mandate for Palestine. Although Palestinian Arabs vehemently resisted the Declaration throughout Mandate Palestine, a lack of centralised representative ensured that they failed to influence or resist the Declaration at its conception.
The primary group that resisted the Balfour Declaration were Palestinian Arabs. “From the very beginning of British rule in Palestine, Zionist aims met with an all-embracing opposition from the native Arab population.”2 That their resistance was violent, consistent and forceful is symptomatic of the scale of the threat that the Declaration represented to their political rights in Palestine. The fact that Palestine as a nation was a post-war creation did not remove the sense of Arab autonomy. In fact, under the declining Ottoman Empire, a reasonable amount of devolution had taken place, with Palestinian Arabs taking part in administering Palestine. For instance, “the 1858 Ottoman land law… helped the urban notables to increase their landholding and their domination of local administrative posts and… a role in provincial government.” 3 The Balfour Declaration heralded Zionism as a challenge to these fledgling political freedoms. Indeed, the very wording of the Declaration was typical of Zionist thought, in that it failed to even identify the Palestinian Arabs as a separate people. The Declaration declared that “nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine” but made no mention of important political or even economic rights. 4 However, the lack of a coherent political platform on which the Palestinian Arabs could negotiate and bring their grievances to the British during the formulation of the Declaration ensured that this source of resistance was, on the whole, violent and populist, as opposed to diplomatic; the Palestinian Arab masses resisted the implications of the Balfour Declaration consistently throughout the Mandate Period. The first signs of Arab dismissal of the Balfour Declaration came quickly, when “reports of Arab unrest from officials in Palestine inspired the British to send a Zionist delegation led by Weizmann in the spring of 1918. Once there, he met with Palestinian notables…” 5 Weizmann managed to quell unrest by informing Arabs that the Jews had limited political objectives. But this, frankly, bare-faced lie would not satisfy Palestinians, particularly when the truth became increasingly apparent over subsequent years. Notably, it only took until February-April 1920 for the first serious anti-Zionist demonstrations to erupt into riots in Jerusalem, causing a disturbance worthy of a cessation of the British military administration in Palestine in favour of a civil one. 6 This type of popular, violent, anti-Zionist uprisings became the pattern for British-Mandated Palestine as Arabs increasingly revealed their opposition to a Declaration that threatened to rob them of a land that they considered undeniably their home.
However, just as the Balfour Declaration caused division amongst different Jewish communities, there were also a range of reactions amongst the Arabs: somewhat surprisingly, the Sharif Husayn of Mecca did not resist the Balfour Declaration, despite being an Arab nationalist. Prior to 1917, Husayn had received wartime promises from the British government that Palestine would form part of an independent Arab state after the Ottoman defeat and, ironically, it was primarily due to his belief that those contravening wartime promises would still be met that he did not resist. From July 1915 to January 1916, the British High Commissioner in Egypt Henry McMahon and the Sharif of Mecca exchanged a series of letters. 7 In these, the Sharif assured the British that his Arab armies would fight the Ottomans in the Middle East (a campaign known as the Arab Revolt); aid that the disastrous Gallipoli campaign taught the British was necessary. Providing this condition was met, McMahon stated, in incredibly vague language, the Arabs would be free to establish their own independent state. “Great Britain is prepared to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs in all the regions within the limits demanded by the Sherif [sic] of Mecca.” 8 Although the terms of the Balfour Declaration clearly conflicted with this earlier promise to Husayn, British officials wasted no time in assuring the Sharif that black was in fact white. Mark Sykes, the co-author of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, immediately followed the Declaration by informing Husyan that the British support for the Jewish home only stretched so far as to be compatible with the economic and political freedoms of Arabs already dwelling in Palestine. 9 Therefore, although Husayn would certainly have resisted the Declaration had he believed that a Jewish state in Palestine would have resulted from it, he was suitably convinced that the earlier promises of the British would not be abandoned and was thus unconcerned. Smith therefore correctly asserts that Husayn only failed to resist the Balfour Declaration at its outset because he had been misled: Husayn “opposed a Jewish state , a Zionist goal that [British officials] refrained from imparting to him…This had happened because the British needed Husayn and the continuance of the Arab Revolt…” 10 Indeed, the Balfour Declaration was startling for who failed to resist it, like the Sharif who instead kept his faith in British promises of an independent Arab Kingdom under his authority.
However, while the Palestinian Arabs did lack a strong, centralized representative to champion their rights before the British, Lord Curzon, Secretary of State for India, resisted the Declaration because he considered Palestine inappropriate for such a Home, partly due to fears over Palestinian rights. Whilst those British officials who resisted the Balfour Declaration generally did so on the basis of protecting “the status of the principle of Jewish emancipation in England,” Curzon was fairly unique in that he voiced concern over the suitability of Palestine for this national home. 11 Minutes of a War Cabinet meeting of October 31st 1917, a mere two days before the Balfour Declaration, reveals that Curzon was resisting on the dual basis of the possibility of a negative effect on the position of “Jews in Western countries” and because he felt “Palestine was inadequate to form a home for the Jews or any other people.” 12 While it is important to acknowledge that Curzon did not resist the Balfour Declaration solely out of defence for Palestinians but recognized other failings of Palestine as a potential National Home, he was unique in that he presented the only resistance from within the British cabinet on the grounds of “what would happen to the present Muslim population.” 13 Ultimately, Curzon alone seemed to understand the future complications that the Declaration would infer: Britain would “be raising false expectations which could never be realised.” 14 However, although it seemed that Montagu (see below) had found an ally in Curzon, this resistance “came too late,” as the Declaration was already deemed to be a political necessity. 15 Rather than halt the declaration of British sympathy, Curzon’s resistance only served to alter the final draft because “he thought that we should be guarded in the language we use” (no doubt a factor in the vagueness of the Declaration). 16
Post-war Palestine is often termed the ‘thrice promised land’ because the British also made an agreement with the French that was subsequently contravened by the terms of the Balfour Declaration. In May 1916, a series of letters were exchanged between French and British foreign officials, notably Mark Sykes and Charles Georges-Picot after whom the Agreement was named, stipulating that the Levant was to be divided into two respective spheres of influence after the war; French in Syria and the north, Britain in the southern areas. 17 Characteristically vague, these British promises essentially implied that although there would be a nominally independent Arab state, the two European Empires would indirectly maintain their imperial interests in the area, which for Britain included a consolidation of a defensive perimeter around that imperial jugular, the Suez Canal. 18 The Balfour Declaration, however, flew in the face of this, as Britain ignored prior commitments to any Arab state in favour of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, even northern Palestine which the French considered their domain. While it is important to remember that the vague language of the Declaration, particularly the phrase “in Palestine” rather than ‘of Palestine’ connotes a sense that the National Home would not constitute the entire land of Palestine, any intervention in French spheres would prove unwelcome. Yet the French were also among those that did not actively resist the Declaration, for various reasons. Firstly, it was Britain that defeated the Ottoman Empire during the war and thus “occupied Palestine, Syria and Iraq”; any wartime treaties that were not conducted from this overwhelming position of strength were not likely to be upheld. 19 Moreover, the French had more interest in Syria, which in practice meant “at Versailles, Lloyd George allowed France to take Syria as long as Britain could take Iraq and Palestine.” 20
In his memoirs published shortly after the creation of the new state of Israel, of which he was instated President, Chaim Weizmann explains how certain members of the British civil service were, “like many others, taken aback by the anti-Zionism of the leading ‘British’ Jews.” 21 This is indeed surprising, particularly when contrasted with a traditional yet simplistic Israeli historical consciousness that emphasized the overwhelming Jewish support for Zionism and the violent Arab resistance. Yet Weizmann proceeds to explain why some Jews resisted the Balfour Declaration; those who had been fully assimilated into European culture “looked upon [Zionism] as a primitive tribalism. They felt themselves… called upon to ‘rescue’ Judaism from Zionism…” 22 Rather than seize upon Zionism as a solution to the problems that Jews faced within the Diaspora, many Jews, particularly in Western Europe where democratic freedoms made assimilation more feasible, assimilated so successfully that Zionism became a threat. A prime example of this is attitude is found in Edwin Montagu, the only Jew serving in the British cabinet, whose “objections stemmed mostly from his feeling that a declaration in support of a Jewish state in Palestine, defining the Jews as a separate nation, would threaten the position of assimilated Jews in countries where they had established themselves as citizens.” 23 As Montagu held the powerful position as Secretary of State for India, his resistance to this aspect of Zionism ensured an alteration of the final text. In the final draft of the Balfour Declaration, the support for the Jewish National Home is given as conditional “that nothing shall be done which may prejudice… the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.” 24 While Montagu, as a reflection of leading British Jews, did not resist the Balfour Declaration to the point of preventing its issue, his resistance is notable in that it was representative of the wider, passive resistance to the assumptions of Zionism inherent within communities of assimilated Jews that continued after its publication. It also led to a modification of the text itself.
Yet this opposition to the Balfour Declaration was not damaging and can be overstated; after publication, Montagu himself “kept silent.” 25 It was found mainly in Western Europe where Diaspora Jews had the freedom to participate in society, whereas Zionism was still rife among those large communities of Jews suffering persecution and estrangement in Russia, Poland and Eastern Europe (communities that Weizmann more readily identifies with). Weizmann himself dismisses those Jews who rejected Zionism as “people who have cut themselves adrift from Jewry,” because as a Zionist he was unsympathetic with this opposition and prefers to view Zionism as inherently Jewish. 26 Moreover, although the resistance of those Jews who were within the British government or whose opinion was taken into consideration were especially influential, this resistance was only directed towards the insinuation that all Jews should renounce native citizenship and migrate and served not to prevent the Declaration but only to add a clause combating this.
In addition to those assimilated Jews who resisted because they felt their political status was threatened were European Orthodox Jews, whose opposition was founded upon their religious beliefs. Those Jews who were religious based their opposition to Zionism on the message of the Hebrew Bible (the Old Testament), an example of which is found in Deuteronomy. Moses is recorded as saying to the Israelites, just prior to their entry into the land,
“For I command you today to love the LORD your God, to walk in his ways, and to keep his commands, decrees and laws; then you will live and increase, and the LORD your God will bless you in the land you are entering to possess. But if your heart turns away and you are not obedient… you will… not live long in the land you are crossing the Jordan to enter and possess.” 27 (emphasis added)
The fact that the biblical covenant was conditional ensured that the Orthodox had always believed that they had been banished from the Promised Land of Israel to the Diaspora by Yahweh because of their unfaithfulness to His covenant and, therefore, it was only by His divine restoration that they would be able to turn. In contrast, those Jews who had abandoned their wait for Yahweh’s restoration and instead turned to the secular ideology of Zionism were considered simply alien, if not blasphemous. However, their resistance was to Zionism as an ideology and did not manifest itself specifically against the Balfour Declaration in any notable way (shown by the fact that acknowledgement of this source of resistance is lacking in British cabinet meetings). 28 It was also a passive resistance, as they failed to cooperate with the spirit of the Balfour Declaration rather than actively working contrary to it; it cannot be legitimately described as resistance.
Furthermore, Isaiah Friedman has convincingly argued that many Orthodox were actually ‘converted’ to Zionism by its growing success as reflected in the Balfour Declaration. “From Zurich, where hundreds of delegates from various countries met on February 18-25, 1919, they called upon the Peace Conference to recognize Palestine as the country of the people of Israel, whose religious duty it was to rebuild the land…” 29 Although Friedman focuses primarily upon positive responses to the Declaration and thus is unlikely to comment on any who resisted it, it seems that while those who opposed the Balfour Declaration were generally passive in their resistance, the Balfour Declaration was an important turning point in that it convinced many that Zionism represented a Jewish duty. Moreover, this inconsistent but present Orthodox support was convened to British authorities, as they sought the advice of prominent Orthodox before proceeding to draft the Declaration. The Chief Rabbi Dr. J H Herz is recorded as stating in a War Cabinet meeting of October 1917 that the “draft declaration is in spirit and in substance everything that could be desired.” 30 Indeed, “messages from Jewish communities in various parts of the world poured into London expressing gratitude and appreciation.” 31 Clearly, European Jews who actively resisted British backing for Zionism were in the minority and those that did so acted to protect their citizenships in European nations from prejudice. It would be by British officials on behalf of the Arabs and from the Arabs themselves that the largest degree of resistance would come.
The fact that the Balfour Declaration was successfully issued and later formed an integral part of British Mandate policy for Palestine is indicative of the surprising lack of resistance during its composition. Indeed, the most important source of domestic resistance to the Declaration, from Jewish members of British society consulted by His Majesty’s Government, merely served to modify the Declaration to prevent it from compromising the political position of European assimilated Jews. The only source of tangible resistance came from the Palestinian Arab majority, who expressed their displeasure through a series of escalating riots that plagued the British administration n the long term and dominated the history of the British Mandate in Palestine. To use counter-factual analysis, were Lord Curzon more successful or if there had been strong Palestinian representatives able to advise the British, perhaps the Balfour Declaration would have been resisted more successfully. Instead, for the increasingly aggravated Arabs, “violence became the only recourse.” 32
Notes
1Arthur James Balfour. Letter to Baron Rothschild. FO Correspondence. London: FO, November 2, 1917.
2 Nathan Weinstock, Zionism: False Messiah. Trans. Alan Adler. (London: Ink Links Ltd., 1979), 103
3 M E Yapp, The Near East Since the First World War: A History to 1995. 2nd ed( Harlow: Pearson Education Ltd., 1997), 121
4 Balfour. Letter to Rothschild.
5 Charles D Smith. Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents. 7th ed. (Boston: Bedford St. Martins, 2010), 77
6 Yapp, Near East, 125
7 Henry McMahon and Sharif Husayn of Mecca, Husayn McMahon Correspondence. FO Correspondence. July 14, 1915- January 30, 1916
8 Ibid.
9 Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 74
10 Ibid., 74
11 Stuart A Cohen. English Zionists and British Jews: The Communal Politics of Anglo-Jewry, 1895-1920. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 175
12 Reuter. War Cabinet Minutes 261. Minutes. (London: Public Record Office, October 31, 1917.
13 Jonathan Schneer. The Balfour Declaration. (London: Bloomsbury Publishing Inc., 2010), 339
14 Reuter. War Cabinet Minutes, 261
15 Schneer, Balfour Declaration, 339
16 Reuter, War Cabinet Minutes, 261
17 Mark Sykes and Charles George-Picot. Sykes-Picot Agreement. FO correspondence. May 16, 1916.
18 Ibid.
19 Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 78
20 Schneer, Balfour Declaration, 371
21 Chaim Weizmann, Trial and Error: The Autobiography of Chaim Weizmann (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1949), 226
22 Ibid., 223
23 Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 71
24 Balfour, Letter to Rothschild.
25 Isaiah Friedman. ‘The Response to the Balfour Declaration’ in Jewish Social Studies , (Vol. 35, No. 2 (Apr., 1973), pp. 105-124), 124
26 Weizmann, Trial and Error, 223
27 Deuteronomy 30: 15-18, NIV
28 M P A Hankey. The Zionist Movement. War Cabinet Minutes. October 17, 1917
29 Friedman, ‘Response’ in Jewish Social Studies, 123
30 Hankey, Zionist Movement, 45
31 Friedman, ‘Response’ in Jewish Social Studies, 106
32 Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 121
Bibliography
Primary Sources
-Balfour, Arthur James. Letter to Baron Rothschild. FO correspondence. London: FO, November 2, 1917
-Bible, NIV.
-Hankey, M P A.. The Zionist Movement. War Cabinet Minutes. October 17, 1917
-McMahon, Henry and Sharif Husayn of Mecca, Husayn McMahon Correspondence. FO correspondence. July 14, 1915- January 30, 1916.
-Reuter. The Mandate for Palestine. Constitution. London: July 24.
-Reuter. The Future of Palestine. War Cabinet Memorandum. October 26, 1917
-Reuter. War Cabinet Minutes 261. Minutes. (London: Public Record Office, October 31, 1917.
-Sykes, Mark and Charles George-Picot. Sykes-Picot Agreement. FO correspondence. May 16, 1916.
-Weizmann, Chaim. Trial and Error: The Autobiography of Chaim Weizmann. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1949.
Secondary Sources
-Cohen, Stuart A. English Zionists and British Jews: The Communal Politics of Anglo-Jewry, 1895-1920. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982
- Friedman, Isaiah. ‘The Response to the Balfour Declaration’ in Jewish Social Studies , Vol. 35, No. 2 (Apr., 1973), pp. 105-124
-Khalaf, Issa. “The Effect of Socioeconomic Change on Arab Societal Collapse in Mandate Palestine.” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Feb., 1997), pp. 93-112
-Mackay, Ruddock. H. C. G. Matthew, ‘Balfour, Arthur James, first earl of Balfour (1848–1930)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Jan 2011.
-Morris, Benny. Righteous Victims: A History ofthe Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1999. London: John Murray Ltd., 2000.
-Schneer, Jonathan. The Balfour Declaration. London: Bloomsbury Publishing Inc., 2010.
-Sizer, Stephen. ‘The Historical Roots of Christian Zionism’ in Christian Zionism: Road-Map to Armageddon?.Nottingham: Inter-Varsity Press, 2004.
-Stein, Kenneth W. The Land Question in Palestine, 1917-1939. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984
-Smith, Charles D. Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents. 7th ed. Boston: Bedford St. Martins, 2010
-Weinstock, Nathan. Zionism: False Messiah. Trans. Alan Adler. London: Ink Links Ltd., 1979.
-Yapp, M E. The Near East Since the First World War: A History to 1995. 2nd ed. Harlow: Pearson Education Ltd., 1997.
-Bible, NIV.
-Hankey, M P A.. The Zionist Movement. War Cabinet Minutes. October 17, 1917
-McMahon, Henry and Sharif Husayn of Mecca, Husayn McMahon Correspondence. FO correspondence. July 14, 1915- January 30, 1916.
-Reuter. The Mandate for Palestine. Constitution. London: July 24.
-Reuter. The Future of Palestine. War Cabinet Memorandum. October 26, 1917
-Reuter. War Cabinet Minutes 261. Minutes. (London: Public Record Office, October 31, 1917.
-Sykes, Mark and Charles George-Picot. Sykes-Picot Agreement. FO correspondence. May 16, 1916.
-Weizmann, Chaim. Trial and Error: The Autobiography of Chaim Weizmann. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1949.
Secondary Sources
-Cohen, Stuart A. English Zionists and British Jews: The Communal Politics of Anglo-Jewry, 1895-1920. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982
- Friedman, Isaiah. ‘The Response to the Balfour Declaration’ in Jewish Social Studies , Vol. 35, No. 2 (Apr., 1973), pp. 105-124
-Khalaf, Issa. “The Effect of Socioeconomic Change on Arab Societal Collapse in Mandate Palestine.” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Feb., 1997), pp. 93-112
-Mackay, Ruddock. H. C. G. Matthew, ‘Balfour, Arthur James, first earl of Balfour (1848–1930)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Jan 2011.
-Morris, Benny. Righteous Victims: A History ofthe Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1999. London: John Murray Ltd., 2000.
-Schneer, Jonathan. The Balfour Declaration. London: Bloomsbury Publishing Inc., 2010.
-Sizer, Stephen. ‘The Historical Roots of Christian Zionism’ in Christian Zionism: Road-Map to Armageddon?.Nottingham: Inter-Varsity Press, 2004.
-Stein, Kenneth W. The Land Question in Palestine, 1917-1939. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984
-Smith, Charles D. Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents. 7th ed. Boston: Bedford St. Martins, 2010
-Weinstock, Nathan. Zionism: False Messiah. Trans. Alan Adler. London: Ink Links Ltd., 1979.
-Yapp, M E. The Near East Since the First World War: A History to 1995. 2nd ed. Harlow: Pearson Education Ltd., 1997.
James Bunyan is a final year history undergraduate at Royal Holloway University of London.