Mahatma Gandhi and the Wounds of History: Palestine, India and the British Empire in the 20th century.

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I am not a continuous student of Palestine but I want to understand and feel the hurts, fears and dreams of all the people living in the area called Israel, or Palestine, or a combination of the two, the Holy Land, or whatever.

I will speak about Gandhi not merely because I know something about him, but because of a sense that his story, and the connected Hindu/Muslim and India/Pakistan stories, may have relevance for Palestine/Israel.

In the year 1888 – almost 130 years ago, that is --, an 18-year-old Gandhi journeyed from a small provincial town in western India, via a recently built Suez Canal, to the bustling city of London.

In the three years he then spent in London, this Gujarati-speaking Hindu from the trading Bania caste became a barrister of the Inner Temple, a fluent writer in the English language, a student of the Bible and of Islam, and for some years an enthusiast of the British Empire.

Two years after returning to India, a 23-year-old Gandhi went to South Africa as a lawyer for a rich Muslim merchant of Indian origin who wished to recover a large sum from a cousin. In South Africa, Gandhi sang God Save the Queen with gusto, and taught his wife and children to do likewise, but he also ran into practices and laws offending his belief that all human beings were equal.

At the end of the 19th century, Winston Churchill also found himself in South Africa, as a correspondent covering the so-called Boer War, in which Gandhi, five years older than Churchill, led an Indian ambulance corps on the British side.

The two met in London in 1906, when Churchill, then in the Liberal Party, was undersecretary for the colonies. The meeting seemed cordial enough but the two would not meet again. By this time Gandhi had enlisted numerous Indians in South Africa for nonviolent action or, in the Indian phrase he coined, satyagraha, clinging to the truth.

Despite disillusionments, Gandhi retained a measure of faith in the Empire. In 1914 he raised a corps here in the UK to assist the War effort. Back in India for good in 1915, he tried in 1918 to
raise recruits for the War in the Gujarat region, which did not and does not produce many soldiers.

However, in 1920, by which time Gandhi had become India’s most influential political leader, he broke with the Empire. There were two chief reasons:

(1) The April 1919 massacre in Jallianwala in Amritsar: and (2) Revelations of secret Anglo-French treaties that gave control over Islam’s holy sites to non-Muslim Europeans.

Asked by his close friend C F Andrews about Arab and Armenian rights espoused by England and France, Gandhi referred to the Treaty of Sevres, said that the ‘oil of Mosul’ was a magnet for European powers, and added:

And now if the king of Hejaz and Amir Feisal can help it, Arabia and Mesopotamia will be drained dry for both these men will be puppets in the hands of [European] officers (20: 359).

In India, the Muslims, a quarter of the population, were now alienated from the Empire, and Gandhi saw an opportunity for Hindu-Muslim partnership and a push for independence. In 1920, he launched a campaign of *nonviolent noncooperation* with the Empire.

Three years earlier, in 1917, the Balfour Declaration had been made.

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From early 1919, India saw an unprecedented spirit of unity and awakening. Although Hindus and Muslims were interdependent on the ground, at the elite level there always was a tension between two notions of superiority. One side was certain of the superiority of its pure belief in the One God; the other of the superiority of pure birth in a Brahmin home.

For a while, it seemed that unity and partnership would grow. But in 1922 the alliance put together by Gandhi began to unravel. Hindus and Muslims resumed their suspicion that the Other was quietly negotiating with the Empire. And in a place called Chauri Chaura in eastern India, demonstrators shouting slogans in praise of Gandhi hacked to death 22 Indian policemen serving the Empire.

At this, a shaken Gandhi, who had just announced a major escalation in nonviolent defiance, called off the whole movement, rejecting what he called the ‘voice of Satan’ which argued that it was cowardly to withdraw right after issuing ‘pompous threats’ to the Empire.

Both the freedom movement and Hindu-Muslim partnership took a hit.

After eight years, however, in 1930, another historic struggle was launched by Gandhi, through the Salt March. Over a hundred thousand in India peacefully courted arrest. In 1931, Viceroy Lord Irwin (later Lord Halifax) released Gandhi and his colleagues and signed a Pact with Gandhi, who agreed to attend a conference in London.

Churchill protested in the House of Commons that Gandhi and the Indian National Congress -- the body leading the independence movement under Gandhi’s guidance -- had been ‘raised to a
towering pedestal,’ and appeasement offered to those inflicting ‘such humiliation and defiance... as has not been known since the British first trod the soil of India’.

During the London conference of 1931, Gandhi talked with every major British leader and was asked to tea by King George V, but Churchill turned down Gandhi’s requests to meet him. In utterances in England, Gandhi did not hide his goal:

> The object of our nonviolent movement (he said) is complete independence for India, not in any mystic sense but in the English sense of the term… I feel that every country is entitled to it without any question of its fitness or otherwise. As every country is fit to eat, to drink and to breathe, even so is every nation fit to manage its affairs, no matter how badly.

In 1937, the Indian National Congress and the Empire reached a promising understanding which produced elected Congress ministries in most of India’s provinces even as the centre remained under British control.

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The War that started in September 1939 destroyed this understanding. Hitler’s War made the British cautious about Indian independence while making Indians more eager than before for it. Gandhi faced a personal dilemma. Could he support a war in Europe while pushing in India for nonviolence in the fight for freedom? In November 1938, a year before the War, he had said:

> If there ever could be a justifiable war in the name of and for humanity, a war against Germany, to prevent the wanton persecution of a whole race, would be completely justified. But I do not believe in any war (Harijan, 26 November 1938).

Added Gandhi:

> [T]he German persecution of the Jews seems to have no parallel in history. The tyrants of old never went so mad as Hitler seems to have gone. And he is doing it with religious zeal. For he is propounding a new religion of exclusive and militant nationalism…

Even as he condemned Hitler, Gandhi proposed, both to the Jews and the Czechs, what he called ‘the superior alternative’ of nonviolence resistance.

November 1938 was also when Gandhi spelt out his views on the bid for a Jewish homeland in Palestine:

> The Palestine of the Biblical conception [said Gandhi] is not a geographical tract. It is in their hearts. But if [the Jews] must look to the Palestine of geography as their national home, it is wrong to enter it under the shadow of the British gun… They can settle in Palestine only by the goodwill of the Arabs… (Harijan, 26 November 1938; 74: 239-42)

On the Nazi persecution of the Jews, Gandhi wrote in November 1938:
If I were a Jew and were born in Germany and earned my livelihood there, I would claim Germany as my home… and challenge [those trying to expel me] to shoot me or cast me in the dungeon; I would refuse to be expelled or to submit to discriminating treatment.

Gandhi then added the well-known lines that sound heartless:

The calculated violence of Hitler may even result in a general massacre of the Jews… But if the Jewish mind could be prepared for voluntary suffering, even the massacre I have imagined could be turned into a day of thanksgiving and joy that Jehovah had wrought deliverance of the race…

Martin Buber, the Jewish philosopher, protested at Gandhi’s willingness to prescribe nonviolent satyagraha to the Jews without understanding German realities. The sufferings of Indians in South Africa or in British-ruled India paled, said Buber, before the Jewish experience of Nazi horrors.iii

In May 1939, Gandhi admitted that explanations by him would ‘give no satisfaction… to my many Jewish friends (Harijan, 27 May 1939; 75: 416).

On 1 September that year, Hitler’s armies moved into Poland. Two days later, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain declared that Britain was at war with Germany. Within hours, Lord Linlithgow announced, without any consultation with its leaders, that India too was at war.

The partnership that Gandhi had carefully forged with the Raj, producing Congress ministries in most of India’s provinces, ended, as did the world Gandhi had known for decades.

In July 1940, Gandhi published an open letter in his journal Harijan, entitled, ‘To Every Briton’, in which he proposed nonviolent non-cooperation as an alternative to war and again added some not very practical lines:

This process or method, which I have called non-violent non-cooperation, is not without considerable success in its use in India. Your representatives in India may… tell you that our non-co-operation was not wholly non-violent, that it was born of hatred.

If they give that testimony, I won’t deny it. Had it been wholly non-violent... you who are India’s masters would have become her pupils and, with much greater skill than we have, perfected this matchless weapon and met the German and Italian… menace with it… (Harijan, 6 July 1940; 78: 386-8)

This appeal from Gandhi was not a serious initiative. It was a by-product of a domestic debate in India on violence versus nonviolence for gaining independence. Its writer made an academic case for nonviolence, whereas the Gandhi who conducted India’s nonviolent campaigns had his feet on the ground. And when the British led by Churchill fought back not only with determination but also with weapons, Gandhi acknowledged their valour.

And when in October 1947, two months after the emergence of an independent India and an independent Pakistan, Pakistani irregulars backed by the Pakistani government raided Kashmir
and the Indian government sent troops to Kashmir to fight them back. Gandhi, in his own words, gave ‘tacit consent’ to New Delhi’s action. He did not say that invaders should be allowed to take over the Kashmiri land.

Gandhi was human, very Indian, and inconsistent. In my opinion, Gandhi need not have, and should not have, offered his utopian advice to the British and to the Jews.

Yet Gandhi may have been right in expressing a sense of injustice at the forcible conversion of Arab-majority Palestine into a Jewish homeland, and in saying that the entry of European or other Jews into Palestine should take place with Arab agreement. And surely he was right in suggesting then and later, before his assassination on 30 January 1948, that in the end the Arabs and Jews of Palestine, and the Jews from outside who wished to reside there, had to find a negotiated agreement.

To return to my narrative of Indian history: In August 1941, Churchill, by now Prime Minister, referred to the Atlantic Charter for national independence and spoke of more than a dozen countries in Europe and Asia where independence was lost or threatened. On India, however, he remained silent. And in November of 1942, after Gandhi’s arrest earlier that year for his Quit India call, Churchill declared that he had ‘not become the King’s First Minister… to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire’.iv

Churchill was not pleased when in May 1944 the Viceroy, General Archibald Wavell, released Gandhi on health grounds. Eight weeks later, Wavell wrote in his diary that the Prime Minister had sent him ‘a peevish telegram to ask why Gandhi hadn’t died yet.’v

In the summer of 1945, as you know, the British people voted out the victor of your war against Germany. Though no longer Prime Minister, Churchill exhorted Viceroy Wavell to ‘keep a bit of India’ even if independence was unavoidable; he also asked for India to be broken up into ‘Pakistan, Hindustan and Prinestan’.

In the summer of 1946, three British cabinet ministers spent three hot months in India in a bid to resolve the India Problem, a crucial piece of which was the demand for the creation of an independent Muslim-majority space: Pakistan.

While there were two distinct Muslim-majority zones in the India of 1946, one in the northwest and the other in the east, there were serious problems with a ‘Partition solution’.

One, any division would leave large numbers of Hindu minorities in Pakistan and Muslim minorities in Hindu-majority India.
Two, although two huge provinces, Punjab in the northwest and Bengal in the east, had clear Muslim majorities, eastern Punjab and western Bengal, large areas both, possessed a clear majority of non-Muslims. Where should these spaces go?

Three, although the Frontier Province had an overwhelming Muslim majority, the province had been voting into office the Congress despite the Congress’s opposition to Partition.

To resolve these difficulties, the 1946 Cabinet Mission to India, as it was called, comprising Lord Pethick-Lawrence, Sir Stafford Cripps and A. V. Alexander and joined as a fourth member by Viceroy Wavell, came up with this ingenious solution:

Create within an Indian Union a **large** and autonomous Pakistan **area**, inclusive of all of Punjab, and all of Bengal, and, contiguous to Bengal, the province of Assam (where non-Muslims were a majority), and, in the west, Balochistan and the Frontier province.

But in their private negotiations with the Cabinet Mission, India’s political leaders were given contrary promises. While the Congress received the impression that Assam and the Frontier Province could remain out of the Muslim-majority area, the Muslim League, led by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, obtained an understanding that in ten years the large Pakistan area, inclusive of Assam, East Punjab and West Bengal, three spaces where Muslims were in a minority, could secede from India and become fully independent.

In an ideal world, the Mission should have told the Congress that the League had to be conceded a large area if it was to agree to a Union, and the League that it had to unreservedly accept a Union if it wanted a large area.

But the Mission was unwilling to fail. Following long and exhausting talks, it drafted a brilliant yet fatally ambiguous document that the League could interpret one way, the Congress another, and both accept, enabling the Mission to declare success.

The formal statement of 16 May 1946 used the expression ‘should be free to’ merge into Groups in one place (Para 15), and ‘shall’ merge elsewhere (Para 19). Three weeks later, Cripps justified this double-speak before the House of Commons, saying that the 16 May statement was kept ‘purposely vague’ to enable both sides to join its scheme.\textsuperscript{vii}

That statement also said that Union and Group constitutions could be reconsidered after ten years, a provision welcomed by the Muslim League as a door to secession. In short, while the League declared the **Union** in the 16 May scheme to be merely temporary, the Congress said the **Groups** were merely optional.

On 6 June, the Muslim League formally ‘accepted’ the 16 May plan while reiterating that ‘complete sovereign Pakistan’ remained ‘its unalterable objective’. Claiming that ‘the foundation of Pakistan’ was ‘inherent’ in what it described as the plan’s ‘compulsory grouping’, the League asserted that the plan gave the Muslim Groups ‘the opportunity and the right of secession’.\textsuperscript{viii}
From the other side, the Congress asserted that even the autonomous Groups would not see the light of day.

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Mistrust on India’s streets multiplied as leaders from the Congress and the League underlined their sharply opposed interpretations of the Cabinet Mission’s proposals and openly denounced each other.

In August 1946, thousands were killed in riots in Calcutta, mostly Hindus on the first day and then many more Muslims. These were followed in October 1946 by killings of hundreds and forcible conversion in Muslim-majority eastern Bengal.

In a bid to bring peace and reconciliation, Gandhi walked in Noakhali in Muslim-majority east Bengal from December 1946 to February 1947. During one phase of this trek, Gandhi stayed overnight in cottages of Hindus and Muslims in 47 different villages. In March and April 1947, he walked in Hindu-majority Bihar province, where thousands of Muslims had been killed in the previous November.

On 20 February 1947, the Clement Attlee government declared in London that the British would leave India within sixteen months or less. It added that a departing Britain would hand over ‘to some form of central government or in some areas to the existing provincial governments’ or ‘in such other way as may seem most reasonable’ -- and that Wavell would be replaced as Viceroy by Lord Louis Mountbatten, the then 46-year-old admiral related to King George VI.

The announcement triggered a violent scramble for power in the crucial Punjab province. In early March, killings occurred in Lahore, Amritsar, Rawalpindi and Multan, all four cities where Muslims and non-Muslims seemed evenly balanced, but numerous murders also took place in the countryside, where Sikhs and Hindus were in a hopeless minority, around the towns of Rawalpindi, Attock, Jhelum and Mianwali.

By now the unity of Punjab was dead. Armed bands – formed separately by Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs -- were poised for action. Sikhs and Hindus began to leave western Punjab for the eastern half of the province.

The Sikhs and the Punjab Congress asked for a division of Punjab into two parts, and on 8 March, when Gandhi was far away in Bihar, the Congress Working Committee also asked for a partition in Punjab and, by implication, of Bengal.

With this resolution, the Congress, acting independently of Gandhi, conceded Pakistan, while insisting simultaneously that areas in Punjab and Bengal where Muslims were in a minority would remain in India. Jinnah called this ‘a moth-eaten Pakistan’.

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In Bihar, Gandhi thought up a ‘solution’ that he thought met local and all-India needs. Conscious of Punjab’s armed bands, and reflecting on Jinnah’s opposition to the division of Punjab and
Bengal and the Congress’s dislike of India’s division, Gandhi felt that if the Congress accepted a Jinnah-led League or coalition ministry at the centre, polarization in Punjab and all of India could be reversed and the unity of India, Punjab and Bengal preserved.

Travelling to Delhi, Gandhi presented his plan in the first week of April to Congress leaders and to the newly-arrived Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten.

Let Jinnah (Gandhi told the Viceroy) head an interim government of his choice, comprising League members alone or including others as well. Secondly, unless the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, ruled that a League measure was against the national interest, the Congress, which had a majority in the Central Assembly, would back the League government.

Three, Punjab’s private bands – Hindu, Muslim, Sikh -- should be disbanded. Finally, if Jinnah and the League were not willing, under these terms, to form a cohesive government, Nehru and the Congress should be given the same opportunity.

However, the young admiral taking over in New Delhi had not only determined that partition was the solution, he had prepared his own plan for accomplishing it. Gandhi’s proposal therefore perturbed Mountbatten, who was even more shaken when, on 2 April, the Congress’s leading Muslim figure, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, told him that Gandhi’s plan was ‘perfectly feasible of being carried out’. As the Viceroy recorded:

> I told [Azad] straightaway of Gandhi’s plan, of which he already knew from Gandhi that morning. He staggered me by saying that in his opinion it was perfectly feasible of being carried out, since Gandhi could unquestionably influence the whole of Congress to accept it and work it loyally. He further thought that there was a chance that I might get Jinnah to accept it, and he thought that such a plan would be the quickest way to stop bloodshed.

Would Jinnah agree to the proposal? Though never putting it to the League leader, Mountbatten indirectly probed him on 9 April by saying that ‘it was a daydream of mine to be able to put the Central Government under the Prime Ministership of Mr Jinnah himself’. Thereafter, recorded the Viceroy, Jinnah ‘once more appealed’ against ‘a moth-eaten Pakistan’ and seemed interested in a Jinnah Premiership for all of India.

Though promising Gandhi that he would examine his proposal and privately telling his staff that ‘it would not be very easy for Mr Jinnah to refuse Mr Gandhi’s offer’ and that ‘basically Mr Gandhi’s objective was to retain the unity of India and basically he was right in this’, Mountbatten was in fact opposed to the scheme.

The Viceroy enlisted his staff and associates against it and lobbied himself with Congress leaders. V.P. Menon, a talented member of Mountbatten’s staff, produced, on 5 April, a detailed note for the Viceroy entitled, ‘Tactics to be adopted with Gandhi as regards his scheme’.

The upshot of these energetic efforts was that Gandhi’s Congress colleagues firmly rejected his proposal, which therefore was never put to Jinnah. On 11 April, in a letter to Mountbatten, Gandhi admitted defeat.
A diary entry by Rajagopalachari (a Congress leader participating in the deliberations and Mountbatten’s successor as India’s Governor-General) states that Gandhi’s ‘ill-conceived plan of solving the present difficulties’ was ‘objected to by everybody and scotched’.

Jinnah scholars in Pakistan have generally doubted that he would have agreed to Gandhi’s proposal. However, Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah’s American biographer, thinks that Gandhi’s plan ‘might just have worked’. ‘Surely,’ Wolpert wrote, ‘this was a King Solomon solution’.

India’s Great Carnage started four months after Gandhi’s Jinnah plan was torpedoed by the Mountbatten-led exercise. Up to a million were killed in both halves of Punjab in a three-month period. In a speech on 27 September 1947, Winston Churchill, now in the opposition, underscored Gandhi’s shame:

> The fearful massacres which are occurring in India are no surprise to me. We are, of course, only at the beginning of these horrors and butcheries, perpetrated upon one another, with the ferocity of cannibals, by the races gifted with capacities for the highest culture, and who had for generations dwelt, side by side, in general peace, under the broad, tolerant and impartial rule of the British Crown and Parliament. I cannot but doubt, that the future will witness a vast abridgment of the [subcontinent’s] population.

To these formidable phrases from his old foe, Gandhi, who had arrived in Delhi from eastern India and hoped to go on to Punjab, offered an impressive response.

Speaking to those present at his prayer-meeting on September 28, he first translated into Hindi Churchill’s hurtful sentences. Next he called the former Premier ‘a great man’, added that there was ‘no doubt’ that Churchill, who ‘took the helm when Great Britain was in great danger’, had ‘saved the British Empire’ in World War II, and admitted that ‘a few [hundred thousand persons] in India had taken to the path of barbarism’.

Then he took Churchill to task for describing the killings in India with, as Gandhi put it, ‘such relish’, and asked Churchill ‘to take the trouble’ of thinking about Britain’s responsibility in the tragedy.

Though not referring to Churchill’s personal wish for India’s break-up, Gandhi added that by dividing India before quitting, Britain had ‘unwittingly invited the two parts of the country to fight each other’, a step ‘the future may or may not justify’. He concluded by saying to his people:

> Many of you have given grounds to Mr. Churchill for making such remarks. You still have sufficient time to… prove Mr. Churchill’s prediction wrong (97: 6-8).

A question must be asked: When confronted by the profound divisions that marked both the subcontinent and Palestine, what was of greater importance for the Empire’s leaders: the strategic implications of different policies, or an assessment of how policies would affect the future story of millions of divided neighbours?
I must stress that imperial divide-and-rule was only one of the factors behind India’s 1947 carnage. Indigenous rhetoric was another. Hindu, Muslim and Sikh voices deliberately stoked ill-will among Indians.

Where, putting his life at risk, a Gandhi asked for calm and non-retaliation and fasted for peace, polarizers on both sides exaggerated the wrongs of the Other and glorified revenge. The message of friendship was passionately countered by a message of hostility.

Again, London’s abrupt announcement on February 20, 1947 that the British would very soon leave all of India was not accompanied by any plan of who would replace them in Lahore, Calcutta or Delhi.

Gandhi offered an additional explanation. When friends asked why years of teaching nonviolence had not prevented killings, this is what Gandhi said on 24 July 1947, before Punjab’s great carnage in August, September and October of that year:

    Outwardly we followed truth and non-violence. But inwardly there was violence in us. We practised hypocrisy and as a result we have to suffer the pain of mutual strife. Even today we are nurturing attitudes that will result in war and if this drift is not stopped we shall find ourselves in a conflict much more sanguinary than the Mutiny of 1857 (96: 129).

The twin components of Gandhi’s nonviolence, ‘fear not’ and ‘hate not’, were both difficult to practice, but the first found wider acceptance than the second. In his Discovery of India, written in detention in the mid-1940s, Jawaharlal Nehru wrote that ‘the dominant impulse in India under British rule was of… pervasive, oppressing, strangling fear’. Thanks to Gandhi, added Nehru,

    That black pall of fear was lifted from the people's shoulders, not wholly of course, but to an amazing degree…

Hatred, however, proved more resistant. Gandhi had warned his compatriots that hate was a master, not a slave, that it could not be confined to one channel, saying in 1926:

    We cannot love one another if we hate Englishmen. We cannot love the Japanese and hate Englishmen. We must either let the law of love rule us through and through or not at all. Love among ourselves based on hatred of others breaks down under the slightest pressure.

Gandhi’s analysis went against the pleasing belief that Indians generally had assented to his tough prescription, which was that while British rule had to be opposed, the English, the Scots, the Irish and the Welsh had to be accepted, even loved, as individuals.

A core of satyagrahis – fighters dedicated to nonviolence -- indeed implemented the prescription. But in its restraint, this core did not represent the mass attitude.
To be asked to love the British people was too much for the great bulk of those who cheered and supported Gandhi-inspired satyagrahas, or took part in other revolts. It was only a short step from hating the British to hating Hindus or Muslims.

On 30 January 1948, Gandhi was killed because some Hindus thought he was friendlier than necessary to the Muslims. Yet by then he -- and his colleagues Nehru and Patel -- had helped ensure that India would not become a theocratic or a Hindu state.

For 70 years since then, India has remained a nation for all, where – at least in theory and often in practice too -- Muslims and other minorities receive the state’s protection.

Now, however, 70 years later, there is a concerted attempt, backed by powerful forces, to make India a Hindu state where Muslims, Christians and other non-Hindus must accept a second-class and subservient status.

* Let me raise a couple of questions before closing.

One, if a people are held in permanent subjection, what sentiment does that invite?

Two, is there a remedy for ill-will, dislike, hate?

This is both an individual and a national question. When the innocent are killed in terrorist violence, a state -- or a group of states -- is bound to reply with stern measures. But bombs do not obliterate anger or hate.

What seemed to melt resentment in May 2011 – you will remember – were the significant remarks the Queen made in Ireland. Her acknowledgment that things had been done in Ireland which ‘we wish had been done differently or not at all’ seemed to impact a broad spectrum in that land.

About two years ago, in June 2015, there were couple of healing moments I witnessed in the United States of America. In a courtroom in Charleston, South Carolina, where – with all of America watching on TV – African-American relatives of women and men killed two days previously -- in a shooting inside a church during Bible study -- offered their forgiveness to the killer standing before them.

The second moment came a week later when President Obama, giving a eulogy in Charleston for the pastor of the church who was one of the victims, interrupted his remarks and, after a pause, broke slowly into the lines of Amazing Grace.

If you listen to the eulogy, inclusive of those lines -- it is on YouTube --, you too might think that it was healing. At any rate, many in America experienced a moment when ill-will seemed to dissolve in millions of moist eyes.
Will such moments be experienced in India and Pakistan, in Israel and Palestine, in other places of pain? And can such moments last longer than the June 2015 moments in the US, which were followed some months later by an election-related rhetoric resounding with ill-will?

Who knows? But we can continue praying, and we can accept a few simple if hard truths.

One, double-speak does not work.

Two, imposed solutions do not work.

Three, the past must be squarely acknowledged.

May we find the courageous ways that can take us a little closer to forgiveness, reconciliation and justice.

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vi Moon (ed.), *Wavell*, p. 120 and p. 168.


ix For the text of his scheme that Gandhi left with the Viceroy on 4 April, see *Collected Works*, 94: 229.

x *Transfer of Power*, 10: 86.

xi *Transfer of Power*, 10: 104.

xii *Transfer of Power*, 10: 84.

xiii *Transfer of Power*, 10: 129.


